

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

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Action

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Rec'd: OCTOBER 24, 1962

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SS

Info

FROM: BONN

022

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1205, OCTOBER 24, 11 AM

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY.

ACHESON AND I SPENT ALMOST TWO HOURS WITH CHANCELLOR LATE YESTERDAY. HE HAD OBVIOUSLY REFLECTED FURTHER ON COURSE OF ACTION RE CUBA ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT AND HAD CONCLUDED IT WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO CHECK SOVIETS. HE DID NOT AT FIRST SAY SO, HOWEVER, BUT AFTER INDICATING HIS SUPPORT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, URGED THAT WE DO MORE TO CREATE GREATER UNREST IN CUBA. DESPITE ACHESON'S EXPLANATION OF HOW DIFFICULT THIS WOULD BE UNDER CASTRO'S POLICE SYSTEM, CHANCELLOR PURSUED DISCUSSION AT LENGTH, IN COURSE OF WHICH HE REFERRED TO TELEGRAM FROM GERMAN UN OBSERVER EXPLAINING LIMITED NATURE OF US QUARANTINE ACTION, AND SAID WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE ACTIONS FOR ELIMINATION OF CASTRO REGIME AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CUBA, INCLUDING RAPID TIGHTENING OF QUARANTINE RESTRICTIONS.

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ACHESON EVENTUALLY MOVED DISCUSSION AWAY FROM QUESTION OF UNREST IN CUBA BY EXPLAINING COURSES OF ACTION WHICH HAD BEEN AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND REASONS WHY CURRENT POLICY WAS DECIDED UPON. ADENAUER LISTENED MOST ATTENTIVELY, AND AT END SEEMED REASSURED BUT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL CONVINCED OF NECESSITY FOR FURTHER FIRM MEASURES AT EARLY DATE TO ACHIEVE OUR PURPOSE. HE ENDED BY SAYING "ABOVE ALL, NO PAPER WAR".

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CHANCELLOR REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO HIS GRATITUDE THAT

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-2- 1205, OCTOBER 24, 11 AM, FROM BONN

ACHESON HAD TAKEN TIME FOR VISIT TO BONN. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HE APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY FOR THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITH OLD FRIEND. HE INDICATED ALSO HOW MUCH HE ANTICIPATED HIS VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT NEXT MONTH.

DOWLING

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